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Fatherhood and
Managerial Style: How
a Male CEO’s Children
Affect the Wages of
His Employees*
Michael S. Dahl,1 Cristian L. Dezsó́ ,2
and David Gaddis Ross3
Abstract
Motivated by a growing literature in the social sciences suggesting that the
transition to fatherhood has a profound effect on men’s values, we study how
the wages of employees change after a male chief executive officer (CEO) has
children, using comprehensive panel data on the employees, CEOs, and fami-
lies of CEOs in all but the smallest Danish firms between 1996 and 2006. We
find that (a) a male CEO generally pays his employees less generously after
fathering a child, (b) the birth of a daughter has a less negative influence on
wages than does the birth of a son and has a positive influence if the daughter
is the CEO’s first, and (c) the wages of female employees are less adversely
affected than are those of male employees and positively affected by the
CEO’s first child of either gender. We also find that male CEOs pay themselves
more after fathering a child, especially after fathering a son. These results are
consistent with a desire by the CEO to husband more resources for his family
after fathering a child and the psychological priming of the CEO’s generosity
after the birth of his first daughter and specifically toward women after the birth
of his first child of either gender.
Keywords: CEOs, top management teams, values, organizational demo-
graphics, wages, gender, work and family
Ever since Barnard (1938), it has been argued that organizations are reflections
of their top managers (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Carpenter, Geletkanycz,
and Sanders, 2004), and existing evidence supports the proposition that top
managers have a management ‘‘style.’’ In particular, top managers’ experience,
captured by traits such as age, tenure, education, and functional background,
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has been associated with many of a firm’s policies (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar,
2003; Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009), including the level and distri-
bution of firm-wide wages (Bastos and Monteiro, 2011). At the same time,
researchers have made the case that a firm’s policies are also shaped by their
top managers’ values (Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick and Brandon,
1988), that is, their beliefs about abstract desirable goals, which serve as moti-
vators and guiding principles for action (Schwartz, 2009).
Yet values have not been the focus of systematic inquiry, and there is only
suggestive evidence to support the premise that they have an influence
(Adams, Licht, and Sagiv, 2011). In fact, as Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella
(2009) noted, some of the most fundamental issues regarding executive values
are still wide open for investigation, including how executives’ values are
shaped, whether they have an impact on corporate policies, and if so, which
ones. In this paper, we seek to address this gap in the literature. In particular,
motivated by literature in lifecycle psychology and the sociology of the family
suggesting that the transition to fatherhood has a profound influence on a
man’s values, we investigate how the birth and gender of a CEO’s child differ-
entially influences the wages of his female and male employees as well as his
own wages.
The literature on how children affect their parents is still small, albeit grow-
ing (Palkovitz, 2002), and the link between the transition to fatherhood and
managerial values and style is virtually unexplored. Consequently, we have fol-
lowed Ryall and Sampson (2009) in adopting an inductive empirical approach,
with two implications: first, we have focused on providing robust large-sample
evidence for a previously undocumented empirical relationship of potentially
significant concern to researchers and organizational stakeholders (Hambrick,
2007; Helfat, 2007; Miller, 2007); second, rather than developing a comprehen-
sive set of formal hypotheses to predict how employees’ wages might change
after their male CEO has a child, we offer a more informal theoretical discus-
sion to provide a context for our analysis and an explanation for what that analy-
sis reveals (Helfat, 2007; Oxley et al., 2010). We do not claim that our informal
hypotheses are the only ones that one could plausibly propose a priori. But we
hope that our empirical analysis and theoretical motivation will spur further
inquiry into uncovering the mechanisms underlying our results and lead to new
theoretical development in future work (Hambrick, 2007).
One other aspect of our study is worth highlighting. The birth of a child is in
principle endogenous, so the relationship between employees’ wages and the
addition of a child to their male CEO’s family could be, in principle, a combina-
tion of selection (what the CEO intends) and treatment (how the child affects
the CEO’s values). By contrast, in a Danish cultural context, the gender of the
CEO’s child is effectively exogenous. Thus with respect to the gender of the
CEO’s child and the differential impact of that child on the wages of female
and male employees, our study takes the form of a ‘‘quasi-experiment,’’
thereby allowing us to interpret our results from a causal perspective
(Hambrick, 2007; Oxley et al., 2010).
CEOS, THEIR CHILDREN, AND THE WAGES OF THEIR EMPLOYEES
The notion that the wages of employees will be affected if their male CEO has
a child is based on two theoretical ideas that provide a context for our
670 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
 at Aalborg University Library on November 20, 2012asq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
investigation: first, that a male CEO’s values matter for his firm’s wage policies
and second, that his values are influenced by having children and differentially
so by the gender of those children.
The proposition that top managers matter has received extensive attention
and empirical support (e.g., Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Bertrand and Schoar,
2003; Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009). Much of this evidence has
tied top managers’ experience in the form of traits such as age, tenure, educa-
tion, and functional background to a wide array of corporate policies (e.g.,
Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Finkelstein Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009), includ-
ing the level and distribution of employees’ wages (Bastos and Monteiro,
2011). Moreover, scholars of top management teams have argued that, in addi-
tion to managerial experience, top managers’ psychological characteristics and
values also influence how managers attend to various corporate policies
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Hambrick and Brandon, 1988), and recent empiri-
cal research provides support for this idea (e.g., Hayward and Hambrick, 1997;
Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008; Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007).
While top managers’ values may influence managerial style in manifold
ways, one important channel is by affecting managers’ attitudes toward various
stakeholder groups, including a firm’s employees (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood,
1997). Given CEOs’ discretion over the distribution of a firm’s resources and
the importance of equity considerations in setting wages (Levine, 1993), it
seems intuitive that CEOs’ values would influence the generosity of a firm’s
wage policies toward its employees, subject to the constraints of the labor
market and the CEO’s other goals of increasing a firm’s profitability or his own
wages. This would be consistent with recent empirical work showing that
female-led firms have more gender-equitable wage policies (Cardoso and
Winter-Ebmer, 2010). More generally, managers’ other-regarding values, that
is, their values related to social equality, generosity, and concern for others’
well-being (England, 1967; Rokeach, 1973; Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1992),
have also been linked to managers’ support for a firm’s non-shareholder consti-
tuencies, which include employees (Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld, 1999;
Adams, Licht, and Sagiv, 2011). Similarly, several models in the literature on
social preferences could be related to CEOs sharing rents with their employ-
ees: CEOs might care about fairness in pay (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000), might be inclined to help the least well-off (Charness
and Rabin, 2002), or might identify more with their employees (Akerlof and
Kranton, 2000; Chen and Li, 2009) (see Meier, 2007 for a review). The transi-
tion to fatherhood is likely to make such values more salient.
The Transition to Fatherhood
We expect having a child to affect a CEO’s values because it is one of the most
momentous events that can occur in a man’s life. On the one hand, gaining a
new family member requires stressful social readjustment (Holmes and Rahe,
1967). On the other hand, having children is a source of intrinsic pleasure and
achieves the normative goal of family completeness (Schoen et al., 1997). For
most people, parenthood is the primary generative encounter, whereby an indi-
vidual embraces the goal of caring for and fostering the next generation
(Erikson, 1964, 1968). Fatherhood thus operates as a catalyst for personal
growth (Palkovitz, 2002) by significantly changing a man’s role in society, his
Dahl, Dezsó́, and Ross 671
 at Aalborg University Library on November 20, 2012asq.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
self-construal, and his priorities as he assumes the new role of caring for his
offspring (George, 1980; Cowan and Cowan, 1992).
One of the most salient aspects of the traditional father role is that of the
‘‘good provider.’’ Despite increasing participation by women in the labor force
and changing cultural attitudes, there remains a normative imperative, even a
taken-for-granted assumption, that a man should support his family (Tasch,
1952; Bachrach, Hindin, and Thomson, 2000; Christiansen and Palkovitz, 2001),
and there is evidence that couples have a tendency to revert more to these tra-
ditional gender roles after the birth of a child (Coontz, 1997). For example, in
Denmark, women take an average of 272 days for maternity leave versus only
18 days of paternity leave for the average father (Goth, 2007). Moreover, the
need to provide for more people is a principal source of stress for fathers
(Feldman, 1987), who expect that the mother will redirect her attention toward
the child (Spence and Lurie, 1975). This reaction by fathers is understandable,
because raising a child creates a substantial financial burden (Cowan and
Cowan, 1992).
It therefore seems natural to expect that, both in anticipation of and in reac-
tion to his child’s birth, a male CEO would, other things being equal, have an
impulse to husband his firm’s resources for himself and his growing family,
potentially at the expense of his employees by reducing their wages or increas-
ing them less than he otherwise would have done. Moreover, because the
actual or perceived burden of providing for his children is increasing in the num-
ber of children, we would expect this tendency to pay employees less gener-
ously to manifest itself after the birth of each additional child.
The Child’s Gender
We expect the change in employees’ wages following the birth of a CEO’s
child to be moderated by the gender of the child, because systematic differ-
ences have been observed in how fathers tend to relate to children of different
genders and how the gender of a child influences the father’s values. In particu-
lar, while fathers are important caregivers for both sons and daughters,
research suggests that a father attends less to the development of motor skills
and focuses more on grooming with daughters (Tasch, 1952). Fathers verbalize
more with daughters (Rebelsky and Hanks, 1971) and are, in general, less con-
cerned with achievement and more concerned with interpersonal development
than they are with sons (Block, 1983). Fathers are also said to adopt a less
authoritarian attitude with daughters than with sons (Cowan and Cowan, 1992).
All told, these differential behaviors could be expected to prime a more coop-
erative orientation in a male CEO and more specifically to prime his other-
regarding values, that is, his attachment to the well-being of others.
More generally, Warner (1991) proposed in pioneering research that values
are transmitted not only from parents to their children but also from children to
their parents. She argued and provided evidence that men parenting daughters
acquire more feminine values. Would such feminine socialization have an
impact on the generosity and thus the wage policies of a male CEO? While
there is a long-standing debate in sociology and social psychology on whether
there really are gender differences in values (Schwartz and Rubel, 2005), there
seems to be broad agreement that women are more likely to hold other-
regarding values, that is, that they tend to feel more responsible for and attach
672 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
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greater importance to the well-being of others when they make decisions than
do men (Beutel and Marini, 1995; Schwartz and Rubel, 2005). Empirical evi-
dence supports this view both in general population samples (Schwartz and
Rubel, 2005) and in CEO and director samples. To wit, Adams and Funk (2011)
found evidence in a survey of Sweden’s population of public corporation direc-
tors and CEOs that women emphasized other-regarding values more than their
male counterparts.
Recent empirical work links this literature with Warner’s (1991) theory by
providing evidence that having a daughter may prompt a father to manifest
more other-regarding values: Washington (2008) showed that U.S. legislators
with daughters tend to vote more liberally, and Oswald and Powdthavee (2010)
showed that the birth of daughters made people in general more likely to vote
for left-wing parties, which tend to promote redistributive and collectivist poli-
cies, at least relative to right-wing parties. Putting this all together, a natural
working hypothesis is that the birth of a daughter to a male CEO and his subse-
quent interactions with her may activate and increase the relative importance
of a male CEO’s other-regarding values. This would entail greater concern for
the well-being of his employees, including their financial well-being. It follows,
then, that although the wages of employees may generally be adversely
affected if their male CEO has a child, this effect may be smaller or even
reversed if the child is a daughter. Furthermore, because the underlying
mechanism relates to psychological activation, which has a binary character,
we would expect the moderating influence of a child’s gender to be more
strongly associated with the CEO’s first daughter than with the birth of addi-
tional daughters.
The Employee’s Gender
We expect the change in employees’ wages following the birth of a CEO’s
child to be moderated by the gender of the employee because the birth of a
child will affect the way a CEO perceives his wife and by extension women in
general. There are two reasons for expecting this change in perception.
First, the role and social status of motherhood have been revered since anti-
quity (Bernard, 1974). Even after the recent advances women have made in
male professions and important positions of leadership (Helfat, Harris, and
Wolfson, 2006), the belief remains widespread that a woman fulfills her destiny
in society by having a child (Thompson and Walker, 1989). Scholars have also
argued that even if the stresses and time commitments of the transition to par-
enthood may decrease overall marital satisfaction (Cowan and Cowan, 1992;
Palkovitz, 2002), a child holds a marriage together and increases the love of a
husband for his wife (Simmel, 1950), because love or approval of one’s child
promotes love and approval of one’s spouse (Thurnher, 1975). In fact, empirical
research suggests that a father tends to credit the mother of his children for
their successes but not blame her for their failures (Spence and Lurie, 1975).
Thus a woman’s successful enactment of motherhood and her ‘‘gift of a child
to the father,’’ as it were—a gift that parents avow will imbue their with lives
so much meaning (LaRossa and LaRossa, 1981)—would be expected to
increase his positive affect and esteem for her.
We would expect the positive affect and esteem generated by the wife’s
enactment of the maternal role to have a positive impact on the father’s
Dahl, Dezsó́, and Ross 673
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perception of and behavior toward women, especially those toward whom he
feels a closer connection, for example, his employees if he is a CEO. Such an
effect would be a manifestation of the pervasive psychological phenomenon of
transference, whereby one’s mental representation of a significant other is acti-
vated in one’s perception of another person, often because the new person
shares some important characteristics with the significant other (Andersen and
Glassman, 1996). The transferred mental representation of his wife from the
CEO to his female employees would then guide his emotional, motivational,
and behavioral responses toward them (Andersen and Chen, 2002).
Second, in the aftermath of childbirth, mothers frequently assert authority
over the welfare and socialization of the child, thereby demonstrating leader-
ship and competence (Thurnher, 1975). This demonstration may transfer to the
father’s perceptions of other women as described above and may also contra-
dict any preconceived doubts the father has about the competence of women
in general.
All told, then, while having children may in general induce male CEOs to pay
their employees less generously, there may be a partly or wholly offsetting pos-
itive effect on the wages of female employees that arises because his attitude
toward them becomes more generous and he holds their competence in higher
regard. As with the birth of a daughter, moreover, the underlying mechanism
relates to psychological activation and accordingly could be expected to have
greater force after the birth of a CEO’s first child, when his wife is making her
initial transition to motherhood, than after the birth of subsequent children, as it
is the first child who is thought to fundamentally alter the sociology of the fam-
ily (Simmel, 1950) and have the biggest impact on the father’s affect
(Grossman, 1987).
Interaction of the Child’s Gender and the Employee’s Gender
Our discussion so far suggests that female employees would doubly benefit
from the birth of daughters. Female employees would, like male employees,
benefit from an increase in their male CEO’s other-regarding values after he
fathers a daughter, especially his first daughter; and female employees would
in particular benefit from the increase in the esteem with which their male
CEO regards them after he fathers a child of either gender, especially his first
child. In addition, Warner (1991) argued and provided evidence that if fathers
are concerned about the life experiences of their children, then having daugh-
ters increases the salience of feminist issues, a form of female-favoring
impulse that could extend to gender equity in a firm’s wage policies.
Consistent with those findings, Washington (2008) found that the effect of hav-
ing daughters on the propensity of male congressmen to vote liberally was par-
ticularly strong on matters related to reproductive rights. It follows that we
should observe a particularly positive change to the wages of female employ-
ees following the birth of a daughter to their male CEO, especially if the daugh-
ter is his first child. A contrasting hypothesis could, however, be formulated
based on Schwartz’s (1992: 12) theory of values, which asserts that other-
regarding values can take the form of universalism, which pertains to ‘‘under-
standing, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people’’
or benevolence, which pertains to ‘‘preserving and enhancing the welfare of
those with whom one is in frequent personal contact,’’ i.e., to a finite set of
674 Administrative Science Quarterly 57 (2012)
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others with whom one is especially close. In the latter case, an increase in a
CEO’s other-regarding values from the birth of a daughter might actually have a
stronger effect on the wages of male employees, with whom he may socialize
and identify more. We will return to these issues later when discussing our
results.
METHOD
Data
We used Denmark’s Integrated Database for Labor Market Research, most
commonly referred to by its Danish acronym IDA, as the source of our data.
The IDA contains demographic information on all firms, plants, and individuals
in the Danish economy. The IDA is compiled by Statistics Denmark, a govern-
mental agency, using the identification numbers assigned at birth to each Dane
as part of maintaining Denmark’s extensive social security system. The IDA
notably includes detailed information about the family histories and wages of
individuals and has been widely used for social science research (e.g., Albæk
and Sørensen, 1998; Sørensen and Sorenson, 2007; Bennedsen et al., 2007;
Dahl, 2011).
Our data were a panel of the 10,655 firms in private-sector industries cover-
ing the period from 1996 to 2006. We excluded firms in industries with a high
degree of public-sector involvement (e.g., schools, energy, renovation, etc.)
and heavily regulated primary-sector activities (e.g., farming, mining, fisheries,
etc.) because the wage dynamics are quite different in such firms. We
excluded firms that had less than 10 employees in any year in the study period
because data on occupational rank are missing for a large share of these
smaller firms. This sample selection criterion also excluded firms that might
more accurately be described as personal trades, for example, operating a food
truck.
We used the IDA to identify the CEO based on employees’ occupational
ranks. If there was more than one person listed in the most highly ranked cate-
gory, we assigned the CEO title to the person with the highest salary in this
rank. In general, a change to the identity of the most highly compensated man-
ager was classified as a change in CEO. In a minority of firms, however, a man-
ager had the highest salary for a continuous period of years except for an
idiosyncratic year when another manager had the highest salary. In such cases,
we considered the first person to be CEO throughout. It is important to note
that because our study encompasses all but the smallest Danish firms, the
CEOs in our sample are not generally as wealthy as the CEOs of large public
companies.
The IDA contains detailed information on the families of all individuals. We
used this information to generate our main variables of interest: the gender,
birth year, and number of children of the CEO. At the employee level, we col-
lected data on real wages (in 2010 kroner), gender, age, labor market experi-
ence, education, marital status, number of children and their ages, full-time
work status, firm tenure, and occupational rank (blue collar, white collar, man-
agement, and top management). We also collected information on CEOs’ real
wages, age, education, marital status, and tenure. At the firm level, we col-
lected information on the firm’s profitability (net income/sales, lagged by one
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year) and size (number of employees, lagged by one year and standardized).
Table 1 provides summary statistics.
Our data contain 4,976,233 employee-year observations for 1,184,169
unique employees over 18 years of age. Of these, 1,560,859 employee-year
observations were for female employees and 3,415,374 employee-year obser-
vations were for male employees. Female employees earned, on average,
231,441 kroner (after reversing the log transformed figure in table 1), the equiv-
alent of approximately $41,659 computed using the 0.18 USD/DKK exchange
rate prevailing on January 1, 2011. Their average age was 37 and they had, on
average, 12 years of labor market experience and 12 years of schooling. Fifty-
nine point seven percent were married, 28.4 percent had children 5 years old
and under, and 48.6 percent had children between 6 and 17 years old. Ninety-
two point three percent of female employees had full-time positions. The
Table 1. Summary Statistics
Female Employees Male Employees
Employee-year Level Variables Mean S. D. Mean S. D.
Employee-year observations 1,560,859 3,415,374
Wages (ln; 2010 kroner) 12.352 0.6641 12.615 0.6741
Age (ln) 3.606 0.2972 3.639 0.3072
Years of experience (ln) 2.486 0.7963 2.692 0.7784
Years of education (ln) 2.460 0.2179 2.497 0.2241
Marital status (married = 1) 0.597 0.4905 0.588 0.4922
Children 5 years and under 0.284 0.5817 0.262 0.5757
Children 6 to 17 years 0.486 0.7994 0.437 0.7896
Full-time status (full-time = 1) 0.923 0.2659 0.958 0.2013
Years of firm tenure (ln) 1.254 0.9695 1.324 0.9892
Blue-collar rank 0.724 0.4472 0.713 0.4525
White-collar rank 0.198 0.3982 0.145 0.3523
Management rank 0.060 0.2378 0.097 0.2958
Top management rank 0.019 0.1348 0.045 0.2077
CEO-year Level Variables
CEO-year observations 58,332
Wages (ln; 2010 kroner) 13.450 0.6226
Age (ln) 3.851 0.1991
Years of education (ln) 2.605 0.1800
Marital status (married = 1) 0.809 0.3929
Number of daughters 0.960 0.8536
Daughter births 790
Number of sons 1.018 0.8765
Son births 802
Number of children 1.979 1.0000
Child births 1592
Years of firm tenure (ln) 1.942 0.9607
Firm-level variables (lagged)
Size (ln, stnd.; number of employees) –1.943 0.9790
Profitability (profit/sales) 0.028 0.0699
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average job tenure was 3.5 years; 72.4 percent of female employees worked in
blue-collar jobs, 19.8 percent in white-collar jobs, 6 percent in management
positions, and 1.9 percent in top management positions. Male employees
earned, on average, 301,173 kroner, or approximately $54,211. Their average
age was 38 and they had, on average, 15 years of labor market experience and
12 years of schooling. Fifty-eight point eight percent were married, 26.2 per-
cent had children 5 years old and under, and 43.7 percent had children between
6 and 17 years old. Ninety-five point eight percent of male employees had full-
time positions. The average job tenure was 3.8 years; 71.3 percent of male
employees worked in blue-collar jobs, 14.5 percent in white-collar jobs, 9.7 per-
cent in management positions, and 4.5 percent in top management positions.
Our data contain 58,332 CEO-year observations for 18,773 unique male
CEOs. CEOs earned, on average, 701,061 kroner, or approximately $126,191.
CEOs were on average 47 years old, had 13.5 years of schooling, and had a
7-year average tenure with their firms. About 81 percent of the CEOs were
married. During the sample period, 1,383 CEOs experienced 1,592 birth
events, of which 790 were daughters, or almost exactly half. As detailed
below, the coefficients on our independent variables of interest were identified
based on these birth events. On average, firms had 86 employees. In table 2,
we report the correlations between the main variables in our analysis.
Empirical Design
Because unobservable employee heterogeneity has been identified as a key
determinant of wages (Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis, 1999), an essential
aspect of our empirical design involves accounting for unobservable attributes
associated with firms, CEOs, and employees. We controlled for unobservable
firm and CEO attributes using CEO fixed effects, with firm fixed effects effec-
tively subsumed by CEO fixed effects, and we controlled for unobservable
employee attributes using employee fixed effects. Combining these fixed
effects yielded a set of CEO-employee fixed effects that account not only for
unobservable heterogeneity associated with each CEO-employee relationship
itself but also with each CEO, each employee, and the firm for which they both
work. A key feature of this empirical design is that the coefficients in our
regressions are identified solely based on changes within each panel as defined
by CEO-employee matches. Thus the fixed effects account for time-invariant
characteristics associated with CEOs, employees, and their firms that may
affect family structure, wages, and social preferences (e.g., a CEO’s own birth-
rank order or the number and gender composition of his siblings).
We also note that gender-related abortion is extremely rare in Denmark,
which is reflected in the fact that the birth events that we observe in CEOs’
families are nearly equally divided between daughters and sons. Thus for
effects associated with a child’s gender, we have a quasi-experimental setting
whereby the gender of a CEO’s newborn child is effectively exogenous, and
unobservable heterogeneity and changes in observable heterogeneity are con-
trolled for at a fine-grained level.
Our initial linear regression model may be written as follows:
Yijt =γCEO number of childrenjt +
X
i
βEiEit +
X
j
βCjCjt +
X
k
βFkFkt +’ij +’t +εijt
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where Yijt is the natural log of real wages of employee i working for CEO j in
year t, and CEO number of childrenjt is the number of children of CEO j in year
t. Eit, Cjt, and Fkt are, respectively, observable characteristics for employee i,
CEO j, and the firm k where employee i and CEO j work in year t. ’ij represent
fixed effects for the match between employee i and CEO j, and ’t are year
fixed effects. εijt is a random error associated with each observation. Given the
presence of fixed effects for the CEO-employee match, the coefficient γ is
identified from births of children to CEOs. Consequently, γ represents the
effect of an additional child to CEO j on employee i’s wages.
Table 2. Correlations
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Wages (ln)
2. Female –.179
3. Age (ln) .349 –.050
4. Years of experience (ln) .436 –.121 .808
5. Years of education (ln) .213 –.077 –.070 –.042
6. Married .223 .009 .417 .394 .041
7. Children 5 years and
under
.032 .018 –.175 –.081 .135 .343
8. Children 6 to 17 years .119 .029 .122 .161 .056 .347 .008
9. Full time .273 –.071 .162 .255 .047 .113 .052 .065
10. Firm tenure (ln) .407 –.033 .418 .484 –.057 .216 –.068 .067 .150
11. Blue collar –.319 .011 –.104 –.073 –.387 –.108 –.079 –.048 –.074 –.022
12. White collar .151 .066 .055 .069 .187 .061 .045 .027 .048 .015 –.698
13. Management .202 –.061 .033 –.032 .314 .044 .066 .021 .038 –.019 –.485 –.134
14. Top management .169 –.066 .094 .088 .096 .075 .003 .031 .028 .052 –.311 –.086
15. CEO number of
daughters
.012 –.014 .002 .004 .004 .010 .009 .011 .017 –.001 –.012 .002
16. CEO number of sons –.020 –.001 –.005 –.007 –.015 –.006 –.005 –.003 –.011 .008 .009 –.013
17. CEO number of
children
–.009 –.014 –.002 –.003 –.009 .004 .004 .007 .005 .007 –.002 –.010
18. CEO age .048 –.012 .071 .070 .005 .033 –.010 .010 .042 .064 –.032 .015
19. CEO years of education .101 .020 .065 .049 .090 .043 .017 .025 .049 .026 –.117 .043
20. CEO tenure –.007 –.031 .014 .026 –.009 .007 –.010 –.002 .017 .126 .020 –.026
21. CEO married .022 –.004 .023 .027 .001 .018 .002 .011 .023 .015 –.018 .009
22. Firm size (ln, stnd.) .063 .098 .021 –.007 .020 .002 –.004 .000 –.005 –.014 –.080 .040
23. Firm profitability .051 .057 .026 .018 .029 .020 .008 .012 .028 .026 –.059 .037
24. CEO wages (ln) .119 .092 .047 .020 .075 .024 .013 .011 .028 .004 –.178 .102
Variable 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
14. Top management –.060
15. CEO number of daughters .010 .009
16. CEO number of sons –.002 .007 –.382
17. CEO number of children .007 .015 .542 .570
18. CEO age .031 .001 .067 .114 .163
19. CEO years of education .138 –.009 .029 –.044 –.014 –.050
20. CEO tenure –.005 .011 .013 .058 .065 .333 –.132
21. CEO married .012 .009 .129 .112 .217 .200 .054 .059
22. Firm size (ln, stnd.) .089 –.017 .002 .020 .020 .117 .225 –.195 .093
23. Firm profitability .052 –.009 –.015 –.009 –.022 .094 .106 .083 .021 .158
24. CEO wages (ln) .136 .025 .046 .065 .100 .223 .272 –.051 .138 .629 .186
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To consider the moderating role of child gender, we modified the foregoing
regression equation by splitting CEO number of childrenjt into two orthogonal
categories, CEO number of sonsjt and CEO number of daughtersjt. To consider
the moderating role of employee gender, we retain the variables CEO number
of sonsjt and CEO number of daughtersjt and run separate regressions on
female and male employees because many of the control variables differen-
tially affect the wages of female and male employees, and failing to account
for these differential effects would give rise to omitted variable bias.1 We con-
sider birth order by further splitting CEO number of sonsjt and CEO number of
daughtersjt into orthogonal subcategories based on whether the CEO has or
does not have a child, daughter, or son, and analyzing their effects on female
and male employees separately.
We calculated robust standard errors to account for any unobservable het-
erogeneity not captured by the CEO-employee fixed effects, including arbitrary
correlation within and across the panels defined by the CEO-employee fixed
effects. This calculation of standard errors subsumes clustering at the firm
level.
Finally, as an extension to our analysis, we studied CEOs’ own wages.
These regressions included CEO fixed effects, year fixed effects, and the con-
trol variables associated with observable CEO and firm characteristics.
RESULTS
Main Analysis
We present results of our initial analysis in table 3. Column (1) reports the
results of a regression of wages on the control variables and the fixed effects
described above.
All controls are highly significant and have the expected signs. At the
employee level, older, more experienced, and longer-tenured employees
were compensated better, as were employees who acquired a higher educa-
tion level and those promoted to full-time jobs or in the organizational hierar-
chy. Marriage was also associated with higher wages, although the effect
was highly gender-specific as shown by the interaction term between marital
status and the gender of the employee. Having children was associated with
lower wages, particularly if the children were 5 years old or younger and if
the employee was female, evidence of the well-known motherhood penalty.
At the CEO level, we note that older CEOs tended to pay higher wages, but
those with longer tenure paid lower wages. CEO marriage was also associ-
ated with higher wages. Finally, at the firm level, we see that larger and more
profitable firms paid their employees higher wages, as expected.
Next, in column (2), we introduce the variable CEO number of children. The
coefficient on this variable is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, indi-
cating that the birth of a child to a male CEO is associated with 0.2 percent
lower real wages than they otherwise would have been. In practice, this would
imply a somewhat smaller increase in nominal wages. This result is consistent
2 To compare results for female and male employees, we also ran pooled regressions in which we
used two versions of each independent variable, one for female employees and one for male
employees. We do not separately report the results of these regressions because they produce
results identical to those reported.
1
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Table 3. Least Squares Regressions of Employees’ Wages (ln) on CEOs’ Children*
Variable
(1) Full
Sample
(2) Full
Sample
(3) Full
Sample
(4) Fem.
Employees
(5) Male
Employees
(6) Fem.
Employees
(7) Male
Employees
CEO number of children –0.002•••
(0.000)
CEO number of sons –0.004••• –0.002• –0.005•••
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of daughters –0.000 0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of sons x
Has no children
0.008••• –0.005•••
(0.002) (0.002)
CEO number of sons x
Has child
–0.004••• –0.005•••
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of daughters
x Has no children
0.011••• 0.006•••
(0.002) (0.002)
CEO number of daughters
x Has child
–0.001 –0.002••
(0.001) (0.001)
Employee controls
Age (ln) 1.069••• 1.068••• 1.068••• 0.420••• 1.335••• 0.418••• 1.334•••
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.044) (0.027) (0.044) (0.027)
Years of education (ln) 0.819••• 0.819••• 0.819••• 0.802••• 0.818••• 0.802••• 0.818•••
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.010) (0.021) (0.010)
Years of experience (ln) 0.439••• 0.439••• 0.439••• 0.600••• 0.378••• 0.600••• 0.378•••
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Tenure (ln) 0.233••• 0.233••• 0.233••• 0.220••• 0.238••• 0.220••• 0.238•••
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Full time 0.302••• 0.302••• 0.302••• 0.251••• 0.304••• 0.251••• 0.304•••
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Full time x Female –0.043••• –0.043••• –0.043•••
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
White collar 0.035••• 0.035••• 0.035••• 0.033••• 0.035••• 0.033••• 0.035•••
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Management 0.053••• 0.053••• 0.053••• 0.049••• 0.054••• 0.049••• 0.054•••
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Top management 0.074••• 0.074••• 0.074••• 0.090••• 0.070••• 0.090••• 0.070•••
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Married 0.022••• 0.022••• 0.022••• –0.037••• 0.011••• –0.037••• 0.011•••
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Married x Female –0.072••• –0.072••• –0.072•••
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Children 5 years and under –0.019••• –0.019••• –0.019••• –0.124••• –0.011••• –0.124••• –0.011•••
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Children 5 years x Female –0.088••• –0.088••• –0.088•••
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Children 6 to 17 years –0.019••• –0.019••• –0.019••• –0.046••• –0.008••• –0.046••• –0.008•••
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO controls
Age (ln) 0.015••• 0.016••• 0.017••• 0.026••• 0.012••• 0.026••• 0.012•••
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Years of education (ln) 0.010••• 0.010••• 0.010••• 0.016••• 0.008••• 0.017••• 0.008•••
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Tenure (ln) –0.016••• –0.016••• –0.016••• –0.014••• –0.017••• –0.014••• –0.017•••
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Married 0.005••• 0.006••• 0.006••• –0.001 0.009••• –0.001 0.009•••
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
(continued)
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with the idea that after his child’s birth, a male CEO husbands his firm’s
resources for himself and his growing family, at the expense of his employees.
The negative 0.2 percent effect on wages represents a reduction of approxi-
mately 555 kroner ($100) in annual compensation. This figure is large enough
to be meaningful, but not so large that it would necessarily prompt an
employee to seek employment elsewhere. As we will see below, moreover,
the economic effects are larger when we account for the moderating roles of
an employee’s gender and a child’s gender.
We split CEO number of children into CEO number of sons and CEO num-
ber of daughters in column (3) to separate the effect of sons from that of
daughters. We find that the birth of a son to a male CEO is associated with a
negative 0.4 percent influence on employees’ wages, whereas the birth of a
daughter has no effect. These results are consistent with the twofold proposi-
tion that, unconditional on gender, the birth of a child provides an impetus for
the CEO to husband his firm’s resources for himself and his growing family at
the expense of his employees, but that this effect is entirely offset by an
increase in other-regarding values from the birth of a daughter. Another possi-
ble explanation is that the birth of a daughter does not affect a CEO’s values,
whereas the birth of a son makes a CEO less other-regarding. We examine this
potential explanation below.
In columns (4) and (5), we analyze how an employee’s gender moderates
the effect of the birth of a CEO’s child by repeating the analysis in column (3)
for female and male employees separately. It is notable that the control vari-
ables have different values in the two regressions. For instance, the coefficient
on employee age is 1.335 for male employees versus 0.420 for female employ-
ees, even though on average they are almost the same age, whereas the coef-
ficient on years of experience is 0.600 for female employees versus 0.378 for
male employees. These differential effects are interesting in their own right
and demonstrate the importance of running separate regressions for female
and male employees.
With regard to our primary independent variables of interest, the results
are intriguing. Both female and male employees experience an adverse effect
Table 3. (continued)
Variable
(1) Full
Sample
(2) Full
Sample
(3) Full
Sample
(4) Fem.
Employees
(5) Male
Employees
(6) Fem.
Employees
(7) Male
Employees
Firm controls
Firm profitability (lagged) 0.060••• 0.059••• 0.059••• 0.028••• 0.078••• 0.027••• 0.078•••
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Firm size (ln, stnd.; lagged) 0.021••• 0.021••• 0.021••• 0.019••• 0.021••• 0.019••• 0.021•••
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 4,976,233 4,976,233 4,976,233 1,560,859 3,415,374 1,560,859 3,415,374
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.19
•
p < .10; ••p < .05; •••p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within- and across-panel
correlation. All models include fixed effects for the CEO-employee match and year. R2 calculated after within
transformation.
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on real wages after their CEO fathers a son, but the effect on the wages of
female employees is negative 0.2 percent and only marginally significant,
whereas the effect on the wages of male employees is negative 0.5 percent
and highly significant; the difference between the two coefficients is also highly
statistically significant (p-value of .001). Moreover, the birth of a daughter to
the CEO is associated with a negative 0.1 percent (albeit insignificant) effect on
the real wages of male employees and a positive 0.1 percent (albeit insignifi-
cant) effect on the real wages of female employees. These results are fully
consistent with the threefold proposition that, unconditional on gender, employ-
ees experience an adverse effect on wages if their male CEO has a child, but
that this adverse effect is lower if the employee is female, lower if the child is
female, and even positive if both the employee and child are female. To
demonstrate this fully, however, we need to examine how these effects inter-
act with birth order.
We do this in columns (6) and (7), which repeat the regressions from
columns (4) and (5), respectively, but separate out the effect of first-born
children from that of subsequent births. It is in these regressions that every-
thing comes together. Considering sons first, the birth of a son always has a
negative influence of 0.5 percent on the wages of male employees and,
except for first-born sons, has a negative influence of almost the same
magnitude (0.4 percent) on the wages of female employees. First-born sons,
by contrast, have a 0.8 percent positive influence on the wages of female
employees, or 1,851 kroner ($333). The difference between the first-born
son coefficients for female and male employees is highly statistically
significant with a p-value of less than .001. This is consistent with the proposi-
tion that the first-born child positively affects a CEO’s attitude toward female
employees.
Considering the effect of daughters, the results show that, in
general, they have a more benign influence on employees’ wages than do
sons, but birth order has a large influence on the moderating role of a child’s
gender. If the daughter is not the first-born child, the negative influence on
employees’ wages is only a statistically insignificant 0.1 percent for female
employees (versus a statistically significant negative 0.4 percent for sons)
and a statistically significant negative 0.2 percent for male employees (versus
a statistically significant negative 0.5 percent for sons). By contrast, the mod-
erating role is much larger if the daughter is first-born: a positive 0.6 percent
for male employees and a positive 1.1 percent for female employees, or
2,546 kroner ($458). The difference between these coefficients is statistically
significant at the 10 percent level. Not only are these results consistent
with the proposition that a first-born daughter positively affects the CEO’s
attitude toward all employees, but the positive 1.1 percent effect of a first-
born daughter on the wages of female employees is also larger than
both the effect of a first-born son on the wages of female employees (posi-
tive 0.8 percent) and the effect of a first-born daughter on the wages of male
employees (positive 0.6 percent), precisely what one would expect from a
condition that combines the positive effect of the first-born child on women’s
wages with the positive effect of the first-born daughter on everyone’s
wages.
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Follow-on Analysis: The First Child of Each Gender
The foregoing analysis did not settle the question of whether a first daughter
who is not the first-born child would have as large a positive influence on
employees’ wages as a first daughter who is also the first-born child or
whether a CEO’s previous experience with fathering sons would in some
sense adulterate the influence of his first daughter on his values and by exten-
sion on employee wages. There may also be some interest in seeing whether
a first son who is not the first-born child would have as positive an influence on
the wages of female employees.
To examine these questions, we repeated the analysis from table 3, col-
umns (6) and (7), this time replacing the dichotomous classification Has no chil-
dren/Has child with either Has no daughters/Has daughter or Has no sons/Has
son. We report an excerpt of the results in table 4, which also replicates, in col-
umns (1) and (2), the relevant portions of table 3, columns (6) and (7) for ease
of comparison.
Columns (3) and (4) compare the effects of first daughters with that of sub-
sequent daughters. A first daughter has a positive 0.5 percent influence on the
wages of male employees versus a nearly identical positive 0.6 percent influ-
ence for a first daughter who is also first-born, as shown in Column (2). By con-
trast, a first daughter has only a positive 0.6 percent influence on the wages of
female employees versus a positive 1.1 percent influence for a first daughter
who is also first-born. This makes sense. First daughters have a positive influ-
ence on everyone’s wages, and first-born children have a positive influence on
the wages of female employees alone. The first daughters in column (3) are
not necessarily first-born so they do not fully reflect the benefit to female
employees of first-born children of either gender. The birth of subsequent
daughters is associated with a negative 0.2 percent effect on the wages of
female employees and a negative 0.4 percent effect on the wages of male
employees. By contrast, the birth of a daughter when the CEO already has a
child of either gender is associated with an insignificant negative 0.1 percent
effect on the wages of female employees and a negative 0.2 percent effect on
the wages of male employees, in each case smaller in magnitude than the cor-
responding figures in columns (3) and (4). This makes sense. The birth of sub-
sequent daughters, like the birth of sons, leads to lower wages for all
employees. The figures in columns (1) and (2) for the Has child condition
include first daughters and also subsequent daughters. We thus see that it is
the first daughter, regardless of whether she is the first child or not, who is
associated with a positive influence on employee wages, whereas subsequent
daughters, like sons, lead to lower wages.
Columns (5) and (6) of table 4 replicate the regressions in columns (1) and
(2) but replace Has no children/Has child with Has no sons/Has son. The coeffi-
cients associated with the birth of a son in columns (5) and (6) are quite similar
to those in columns (1) and (2). As expected, however, the positive effect of a
first son who is not necessarily a first-born child on the wages of female
employees is 0.6 percent versus positive 0.8 percent for first-born children
regardless of gender. This makes sense, as the figure in column (5) is the aver-
age of first sons who are also first-born (who we expect to have a positive
effect on the wages of female employees) and first sons who are not first-born
(who we expect will not have a positive effect on the wages of female
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employees.) In conclusion, then, after investigating the effects of first daugh-
ters and first sons, it appears that the models in columns (1) and (2) are the
most informative.
Follow-on Analysis: The Wages of CEOs
An important part of our theoretical motivation was that the birth of a child to a
male CEO, unconditional on gender, prompts the CEO to husband more of his
firm’s resources for himself and his growing family, potentially at the expense
of his employees. Consistent with this, we observed that except for a CEO’s
first-born child and first daughter, the birth of a child to a male CEO has a nega-
tive influence on the wages of both female and male employees. A natural
question is whether the ‘‘missing money’’ shows up somewhere else.
One place to look is the CEO’s own wages, that is, if the wages of his
employees are lower than they would have been because he fathered a child,
are his wages correspondingly higher? While that is intuitive, several caveats
are in order. First, the birth of a child has a positive effect on how hard and
how productively fathers work (Gray and Vanderhart, 2000; Waite and
Gallagher, 2000), which might result in higher wages for a CEO after he fathers
Table 4. Effects on Employees’ Wages (ln) of the Rank Order at Birth of CEOs’ Children*
Variable
(1) Fem.
Employees
(2) Male
Employees
(3) Fem.
Employees
(4) Male
Employees
(5) Fem.
Employees
(6) Male
Employees
CEO number of sons x Has no children 0.008••• –0.005•••
(0.002) (0.002)
CEO number of sons x Has child –0.004••• –0.005•••
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of daughters x Has no children 0.011••• 0.006•••
(0.002) (0.002)
CEO number of daughters x Has child –0.001 –0.002••
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of sons x Has no daughters –0.002 –0.006•••
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of sons x Has daughter –0.001 –0.004•••
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of daughters x Has no daughters 0.006••• 0.005•••
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of daughters x Has daughter –0.002•• –0.004••
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of sons x Has no sons 0.006••• –0.004•••
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of sons x Has son –0.005••• –0.006•••
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of daughters x Has no sons 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
CEO number of daughters x Has son –0.001 –0.001•
(0.001) (0.001)
•
p < .10; ••p < .05; •••p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within- and across-panel
correlation. All models include fixed effects for the CEO-employee match and year. Columns (1) and (2) replicate
columns (6) and (7) from table 3 for comparison.
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a child without necessarily impacting the wages of employees. Second, CEOs
have other ways of extracting rent from their firms, many of which we cannot
observe in these data; examples include cash distributions associated with
ownership stakes, executive loans, and the consumption of perquisites. Third,
Table 5. Least Squares Regressions of CEOs’ Wages (ln) on CEOs’ Children (N = 58,332)*
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO number of children 0.049•••
(0.010)
CEO number of sons 0.064•••
(0.017)
CEO number of daughters 0.035•••
(0.012)
CEO number of sons x Has no children 0.037•
(0.021)
CEO number of sons x Has child 0.071•••
(0.020)
CEO number of daughters x Has no children 0.052•••
(0.020)
CEO number of daughters x Has child 0.031••
(0.015)
CEO number of sons x Has no daughters 0.044••
(0.017)
CEO number of sons x Has daughter 0.078•••
(0.026)
CEO number of daughters x Has no daughters 0.052•••
(0.015)
CEO number of daughters x Has daughter 0.020
(0.019)
CEO number of sons x Has no sons 0.054•••
(0.018)
CEO number of sons x Has son 0.075•••
(0.027)
CEO number of daughters x Has no sons 0.025
(0.017)
CEO number of daughters x Has son 0.050•••
(0.019)
CEO controls
Age (ln) 0.698••• 0.598••• 0.602••• 0.602••• 0.620••• 0.598•••
(0.148) (0.152) (0.149) (0.149) (0.146) (0.152)
Years of education (ln) 0.325• 0.323•• 0.324•• 0.323•• 0.313• 0.327••
(0.167) (0.163) (0.162) (0.161) (0.161) (0.161)
Tenure (ln) 0.025••• 0.025••• 0.025••• 0.025••• 0.025••• 0.025•••
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Married 0.007 –0.003 –0.003 –0.003 –0.003 –0.003
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Firm controls
Firm profitability (lagged) 0.243••• 0.243••• 0.243••• 0.243••• 0.243••• 0.243•••
(0.032) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Firm size (ln, stnd.; lagged) 0.084••• 0.082••• 0.082••• 0.082••• 0.082••• 0.082•••
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
R2 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
•
p < .10; ••p < .05; •••p < .01.
* Standard errors are in parentheses and are robust to heteroskedasticity and arbitrary within- and across-panel
correlation. All models include fixed effects for the CEO and year. R2 calculated after within transformation.
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a CEO might be content to leave the money economized on employees’ wages
inside the firm for use on a rainy day, as it were. Nonetheless, we think that
analyzing the wages of CEOs is of sufficient interest to merit exploratory analy-
sis, which we present in table 5.
Column (1) reports the results of a regression of (logged) CEO wages on
observable CEO and firm characteristics and fixed effects at the CEO and year
level. All controls (except for the CEO’s marital status) are highly significant and
have the expected signs. Older, more experienced, and longer-tenured CEOs
were compensated better, as were CEOs who acquired a higher education
level. CEOs of larger and more profitable firms were also compensated better.
Next, in column (2), we introduce the variable CEO number of children. The
coefficient on this variable is positive and significant at the 1 percent level, indi-
cating that the birth of a child to a male CEO is associated with a 4.9 percent
increase in the CEO’s real wages. In column (3) we consider the moderating
influence of the gender of the child and find that the birth of a son to a male
CEO is associated with a 6.3 percent increase in his real wages, while the birth
of a daughter to a male CEO is associated with a more modest, 3.5 percent
increase in his real wages. Taken together with the evidence that the birth of a
son to a male CEO has a larger negative influence on employees’ real wages
than does the birth of a daughter, these results are indeed consistent with the
notion that the birth of a child to a male CEO prompts him to husband more of
his firm’s resources for his growing family at the expense of his employees
and that he husbands more resources after having a son than after having a
daughter.
In the remaining columns, we consider rank order at birth. The results are
intriguing and suggest that a firm’s wage bill is not a fixed pie in the sense that
changes to employees’ wages do not ipso facto result in proportional changes
to the CEO’s wages. On the one hand, as shown in column (4), a first son who
is also the CEO’s first child is associated with a smaller increase in the CEO’s
wages than a subsequent son; this result is consistent with our finding that
subsequent children impose a negative influence on the wages of all employ-
ees but that first-born children benefit female employees while still imposing a
cost on male employees. On the other hand, as shown in column (5), a first
daughter is associated with a larger increase in the CEO’s wages than subse-
quent daughters, whereas we found that first daughters lead to higher wages
for everyone. Is it possible that the first daughter prompts the CEO to work
much harder or more productively and thereby create a larger pie for everyone
to share? Does the first daughter prompt the CEO to reduce investment and
thereby leave a larger pie to share in the current year at the expense of future
years? These issues merit further investigation, but data limitations oblige us to
leave them for future research.
DISCUSSION
Motivated by research suggesting that the transition to fatherhood influences a
man’s values, we studied how a male CEO’s newborn child affects the wages
of his employees, as well as how the baseline effects are moderated by the
gender of the child and the gender of the employee. Our empirical context
used a comprehensive panel dataset of Danish firms, their employees and
CEOs, and their CEOs’ families. We used fixed effects at the level of the match
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between CEO and employee, creating a quasi-experimental research design in
which the gender of a CEO’s child is effectively exogenous even if the child’s
birth is in principle endogenous. We found robust empirical evidence not only
that a male CEO generally pays his employees less generously after fathering a
child, but also that this effect is moderated by the gender of the child as well
as that of the employee. In particular, a male CEO pays both his female and
male employees more generously after the birth of his first daughter and he
pays his female employees more generously after the birth of his first child.
Thus a female employee benefits doubly from the birth to her CEO of a first
daughter who is also the CEO’s first child. We also found that male CEOs tend
to pay themselves more after fathering a child, especially if the child is a son.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that a male CEO tends to hus-
band more resources for his own growing family after fathering a child as well
as with the hypotheses that the first child activates the CEO’s generosity
toward women and that the first daughter activates his generosity toward
everyone.
It is also worth considering other potential explanations for the results we
observe and reasonable hypotheses one might propose a priori. For example,
that wages are lower following the birth of sons but not the birth of daughters
is consistent with the proposition that sons reduce a male CEO’s other-
regarding values, whereas daughters have no effect. But this explanation can-
not account for the fact that the first daughter has a positive effect on the
wages of all employees, whereas the birth of subsequent daughters has a neg-
ative effect similar to that of sons. In addition, at 1.1 percent, the largest posi-
tive effect on employees’ wages was for female employees following the birth
of a CEO’s first-born daughter. This is consistent with a female-favoring
impulse following the birth of a daughter, as argued by Warner (1991). Yet we
can explain this large positive effect as the confluence of a tendency to favor
female employees following the birth of a CEO’s first child of either gender and
a tendency to be more generous to all employees following the birth of a
CEO’s first daughter. Moreover, there is no evidence that female employees
particularly benefit from the birth of a first daughter who is not first born. In
summary, though we do not claim that the mechanisms discussed in our theo-
retical motivation are the only possible mechanisms that could underlie our
results, we do believe that our theoretical explanation is the most parsimonious
combination of mechanisms that is consistent with what we observe.
In addition to the broader literatures relating to how executive values influ-
ence corporate policies, the determinants of employee wages, and the relation-
ship between the domains of work and family, our results pertain to other lines
of inquiry. In particular, a growing and extensive literature has used laboratory
experiments to test and provide support for social preference models; yet it
remains an open question how much these results apply outside the labora-
tory, particularly with regard to attitudes and behaviors in commercial settings
and to important social issues like wage policy and work and family (Levitt and
List, 2007). Our paper provides robust, albeit indirect, evidence that social pre-
ferences do play an important role in economic life.
We also acknowledge that our analysis has a number of limitations. First and
foremost, while our results are consistent with the proposition that the birth of
a child affects a male CEO’s values and the way he pays his employees, we
cannot directly measure these values, nor can we directly observe the actions
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of the CEOs we study. Likewise, we cannot observe other material changes in
how a CEO treats his employees, for example, in terms of child-related or other
non-pecuniary benefits – although generous periods of parental leave are man-
datory under Danish law and, within the scope of that law, most employees
are covered by collective or individual bargaining agreements, which, we under-
stand, do not change frequently. Thus other mechanisms and effects might be
in play.
Second, while we are able to make claims of causality with regard to the
moderating roles of a child’s gender and, to a large extent, an employee’s gen-
der, we cannot make causal claims with regard to the birth of a child itself,
unconditional on gender, because having a child is evidently non-random. That
said, separating selection and treatment in this context may be mostly aca-
demic, because most births to Danish CEOs are surely either intended or at
least regarded benignly by their parents.
Third, we used Denmark as our empirical context largely because of data
availability. It is unclear how much our results would generalize to non-
Scandinavian countries, especially those where attitudes toward gender and
marriage are markedly different. It is also unclear whether our results will
remain stable as attitudes toward these and other important societal institu-
tions continue to evolve.
This paper has focused on two widely applicable but understudied social pro-
cesses: how children shape their parents’ values and how the values of CEOs
influence corporate policies. If nothing else, we hope this paper will stimulate
more research on both domains. One promising avenue pertains to other mod-
erating factors that might affect how a male CEO responds to the transition to
fatherhood but that we did not have sufficient space to consider here; exam-
ples include a CEO’s marital status, his location vis-à-vis that of the employee,
the rank of the employee, the CEO’s level of education, his birth-rank order,
the number of brothers and sisters he has, attributes of the firm like its indus-
try, size, and profitability, as well as the group dynamics within the top manage-
ment team after one or more of them transitions to parenthood. One could
also study female CEOs as a separate group. Another avenue relates to other
events that could influence social preferences such as marriage or divorce, the
death of one’s spouse—the most stressful life event, according to Holmes and
Rahe (1967)—or another family member, natural disasters, acts of terrorism
and war, and significant changes to sin laws (e.g., prohibition); a nice feature of
some of these events is that they would usually be unanticipated by the
affected parties and thus give rise to natural experiments. Lastly, future
research could focus on different outcome variables, such as investment and
acquisition behavior, diversification, competitive strategy, organizational culture,
other human resources activities (e.g., hiring, promotion, and termination), and
managerial cognition, as well as how a manager might anticipate changes to a
competitor’s strategy as a result of changes to the family structure of the com-
petitor’s CEO.
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